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Abstract: In a previous report [4], a methodology for the numerical treatment of a two-objective
optimization problem, possibly subject to equality constraints, was proposed. The method was
devised to be adapted to cases where an initial design-point is known and such that one of the
two disciplines, considered to be preponderant, or fragile, and said to be the primary discipline,
achieves a local or global optimum at this point. Then, a particular split of the design variables was
proposed to accomplish a competitive-optimization phase by a Nash game, whose equilibrium point
realizes an improvement of a secondary discipline, while causing the least possible degradation of
the primary discipline from the initial optimum. In this new report, the initial design point and the
number of disciplines are arbitrary. Certain theoretical results are established and they lead us to
define a preliminary cooperative-optimization phase throughout which all the criteria improve, by a
so-called Multiple-Gradient Descent Algorithm (MGDA), which generalizes to n disciplines (n ≥ 2)
the classical steepest-descent method. This phase is conducted until a design-point on the Pareto
set is reached; then, the optimization is interrupted or continued in a subsequent competitive phase
by a generalization of the former approach by territory splitting and Nash game.
Key-words: Optimum–shape design, concurrent engineering, multi-criterion optimization, split
of territory, Nash and Stackelberg game strategies, Pareto optimality, descent direction, steepest-
descent direction
∗ INRIA Research Director, Opale Project-Team Head
† In this revised version, the proof of Lemma 1 has been generalized to permit the number n of objective-functions
and the dimension N of the working design-space to compare arbitrarily in the definition of Pareto-stationarity.
Algorithme de descente à gradients multiples (MGDA)
Résumé : Dans un précédent rapport [4], on a proposé une méthodologie pour le traite-
ment numérique d’un problème d’optimisation bicritère, éventuellement soumis à des contraintes
d’égalité. La méthode a été conçue pour s’adapter aux cas où l’on connait un point de conception
initial où l’une des disciplines, dite discipline principale car prépondérante, ou fragile, atteint un
optimum local ou global. Alors, on a proposé une méthode de partage des variables afin de réaliser
une phase d’optimisation compétitive par un jeu de Nash, dont le point d’équilibre produit une
amélioration de la discipline secondaire, tout en causant la moindre dégradation possible de la dis-
cipline principale par rapport à l’optimum initial. Dans ce nouveau rapport, le point de conception
initial et le nombre de disciplines sont arbitraires. On établit certains résultats théoriques qui nous
conduisent à définir une phase préliminaire d’optimisation coopérative au cours de laquelle tous les
critères s’améliorent, par un Algorithme de Descente à Gradients Multiples (MGDA) qui généralise
à n disciplines l’algorithme classique du gradient. Cette phase est prolongée jusqu’à atteindre un
point de conception du front de Pareto; alors, on peut éventuellement continuer l’optimisation par
une phase suivante, compétitive, en généralisant l’approche précédente par partage de territoire
et jeu de Nash.
Mots-clés : Conception optimale de forme, ingénierie concourante, optimisation multi-critère,
partage de territoire, stratégies de jeux de Nash ou de Stackelberg, Pareto-optimalité, direction
de descente, direction de plus grande pente
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1 Introduction, problem setting and notations
In a previous report [4], a methodology for the numerical treatment of a two-objective minimization
problem, possibly subject to equality constraints was proposed. Such a problem is a basic step
in multidisciplinary optimization, sometimes referred to as concurrent engineering. There, we
considered the case where one criterion to be minimized, JA, is preponderant over the second,
JB , that is, either more critical or more fragile. The problem was formulated as a parametric
optimization in which the two criteria are smooth functions of a common design vector Y ∈ RN .
The numerical procedure was defined in two steps.
In the first step, the criterion associated with the preponderant criterion JA(Y ), or primary
discipline, is minimized first, alone, to full convergence by hypothesis, yielding the design vector Y ?A.
As a result, the gradient vector, ∇J?A, the Hessian matrix, H?A, and the K constraint gradients,
∇g?k are assumed to be known at Y = Y ?A. In practice, such information may be difficult to
calculate exactly when the finite-dimensional parametric formulation is the result of discretizing
functionals of the distributed solution of a complex set of partial differential equations, as it is
the case in the prototype example of aerodynamic optimum-shape design; then, possibly, but not
necessarily, the exact derivatives can be replaced by approximations through meta-modeling of
the functionals.
In preparation of the second step, the entire parametric space is then split into two supple-
mentary subspaces on the basis of the analysis of the second variation of the primary functional,
subject to the K active constraints. The construction is such that infinitesimal perturbations
in the design vector Y about Y ?A lying in the second subspace, whose dimension p is adjustable
(p ≤ N − K), cause potentially the least degradation to the primary functional value. In other
words, the second subspace is the subspace of dimension p of least sensitivity of the preponderant
criterion JA.
In the second step of the optimization, a Nash equilibrium [6] is sought between the two
disciplines by introducing two virtual players, each one in charge of minimizing its own criterion,
JA or JAB (a convex combination of JA/J?A and θJB/J
?
B), w.r.t. either subset of parameters
that generates one of the two supplementary subspaces. In this way, the secondary criterion is
potentially reduced, while not increasing unduly the primary criterion from its initial minimum.
The Nash game is given a particular form in which a continuation parameter ε (0 ≤ ε ≤ 1) is
introduced. The optimum solution Y ?A achieved at completion of the first step of the optimization
is proved to be a Nash equilibrium solution of our formulation for ε = 0. Thus, as ε increases
from 0 to 1, the formulation provides a continuum of Nash equilibrium solutions, corresponding
to a smooth introduction of the trade-off between the two disciplines. Along the continuum, the
initial derivative of the primary functional w.r.t. ε is also proved to be equal to zero, which can
be viewed as a type of robust-design result. In practice this offers the designer the possibility to
elect a design point along the continuum, not necessarily at the endpoint ε = 1.
Lastly we observed that the hierarchy introduced above between the criteria was applied to
the split of territory in preparation of a Nash game, which is by essence symmetrical. The bias
is therefore different in nature from the unsymmetrical treatment of the variables introduced in a
Stackelberg-type game [2].
In [4], our formulation was first demonstrated in the simple case of the minimization of two
quadratic forms in R4 subject to a linear, or a nonlinear equality constraint. The methodology was
further illustrated by the treatment a difficult exercise of a generic aircraft wing shape optimization
w.r.t. two criteria, one representative of the aerodynamic performance (drag subject to a lift
constraint) and the other of the structural design (average stress subject to geometrical constraints)
taken from B. Abou El Majd’s doctoral thesis [1].
In this new report, we demonstrate how the general problem of the unconstrained simultaneous
minimization of n smooth criteria (or disciplines) Ji(Y ) (Y : design vector; Y ∈ H; H : working
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space, a Hilbert space usually equal to RN , but possibly a subspace of L2 also) can formally be
accomplished in two phases :
1. A cooperative phase, beneficial to all criteria, in the sense that all criteria are reduced at
each step of this phase.
2. A competitive phase realized through a Nash game with an appropriate definition of the split
of territory.
In the usual case of a finite-dimensional working space H = RN , no assumption is made on
how the integers n and N compare.
The cooperative phase is conducted by an algorithm that generalizes the classical steepest-
descent method to n concurrent disciplines. At completion of this phase, the design vector provides
a point on the Pareto set that is not necessarily Pareto-optimal [5], if not all the criteria are locally
convex. In that case only, it makes sense to define a subsequent minimization phase, competitive
in nature. For this, we propose to generalize the split of territory defined in the former report
[4] in preparation of a dynamic Nash game, implemented numerically, preferably on a parallel
architecture.
2 Pareto concepts
We refer to the excellent textbook by K. Miettinen [5] for a detailed review of fundamentals in
nonlinear multiobjective optimization. and much more. Here, we simply formulate a number of
theoretical results that are essential to our subsequent algorithmic construction.
Thus consider n smooth criteria Ji(Y ) (Y : design vector; Y ∈ H; H : working space, a Hilbert
space usually equal to RN , but possibly a subspace of L2 also). In practice, these functions or
functionals are assumed to be of class C1 and convex in some working open ball B of the design
space H. Throughout this report, unless specified otherwise, the symbol N denotes the dimension
of the design-space H when it is finite and the symbol ∞ otherwise.
In this revised version of the report, the following two lemmas are introduced in the alternate
order (and renumbered). Lemma 2 (formerly Lemma 1) is now given a more rigorous and general
proof based on Lemma 1. In particular, the case n > N is now encompassed.
Lemma 1
Let H be a Hilbert space of finite or infinite dimension N , and {ui} (1 ≤ i ≤ n) a family of n
vectors in H. Let U be the set of strict convex combinations of these vectors :
U =
{
w ∈ H / w =
n∑
i=1
αi ui ; αi > 0 (∀i) ;
n∑
i=1
αi = 1
}
(1)
and U its closure (the convex hull of the family). Then, there exists a unique element ω ∈ U of
minimum norm, and :
∀u¯ ∈ U : (u¯, ω) ≥ (ω, ω) = ‖ω‖2 := Cω (2)
Proof : the convex hull U is a closed and convex set, and this implies existence and uniqueness of
the element ω of minimum norm in U .
Let u¯ be an arbitrary element of U ; set r = u¯− ω so that u¯ = ω + r. Since the convex hull U
is convex,
∀ε ∈ [0, 1] , ω + εr ∈ U (3)
Since ω is the element of U of minimum norm, ‖ω + εr‖ ≥ ‖ω‖, which writes :
‖ω + εr‖2 − ‖ω‖2 = (ω + εr, ω + εr)− (ω, ω) = 2ε (r, ω) + ε2 (r, r) ≥ 0 (4)
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and since ε can be arbitrarily small, this requires that :
(r, ω) = (u¯− ω, ω) ≥ 0 (5)
from which the result follows directly.
Let us introduce and use throughout the following very natural definition, although the termi-
nology does not seem to be standard :
Definition 1 (Pareto-stationarity)
Let Ji(Y ) (1 ≤ i ≤ n, Y ∈ B ⊆ RN ) be smooth and convex objective-functions over the open ball
B centered at the design-point Y 0. These objective-functions are said to be Pareto-stationary at
Y 0 iff there exists a convex combination of the gradient-vectors, u0i = ∇Ji(Y 0), that is equal to
zero:
∃α = {αi} such that αi ≥ 0 (∀i) ,
n∑
i=1
αi = 1 , and
n∑
i=1
αi u
0
i = 0 . (6)
Lemma 2
Let Y 0 be a Pareto-optimal point, center of an open ball B in which the objective-functions Ji(Y )
(1 ≤ i ≤ n) are smooth and convex, and define the gradient-vectors u0i = ∇Ji
(
Y 0
)
in which ∇ is
the symbol for the gradient; then, the objective-functions are Pareto-stationary at Y 0.
Proof : Without loss of generality, assume Ji(Y 0) = 0 (∀i). Then:
Y 0 = Argmin
Y
Jn(Y ) subject to: Ji(Y ) ≤ 0 (∀i ≤ n− 1) . (7)
Let Un−1 be the convex hull of the gradients {u01, u02, . . . , u0n−1} and ωn−1 = Argminu∈Un−1 ‖u‖.
By virtue of Lemma 1, the vector ωn−1 exists, is unique, and such that:(
u0i , ωn−1
) ≥ ‖ωn−1‖2 (∀i ≤ n− 1) . (8)
Two situations are then possible:
1. ωn−1 = 0, and the objective-functions {J1, J2, . . . , Jn−1} satisfy the Pareto stationarity
condition at Y = Y 0. A fortiori, the condition is also satisfied by the whole set of objective-
functions.
2. Otherwise ωn−1 6= 0. Then let
ji() = Ji(Y
0 − ωn−1) (i = 1, . . . , n− 1) (9)
so that
ji(0) = 0 and j′i(0) = −
(
ui, ωn−1
) ≤ −‖ωn−1‖2 < 0 , (10)
and for sufficiently small strictly-positive :
ji() = Ji(Y
0 − ωn−1) < 0 (∀i ≤ n− 1) (11)
which establishes that Slater’s qualification condition [3] is satisfied for the optimization
problem (7) subject to inequality constraints. Thus, the Lagrangian
L = Jn(Y ) +
n−1∑
i=1
λiJi(Y ) (12)
is stationary w.r.t. Y at Y = Y 0, and this gives:
u0n +
n−1∑
i=1
λiu
0
i = 0 (13)
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in which λi > 0 (∀i ≤ n − 1) since equality constraints hold Ji(Y 0) = 0 (KKT condition).
Normalizing this equation by dividing by the number 1 +
∑n−1
i=1 λi which is greater then 1
(thus, strictly-positive), results in the Pareto-stationarity condition.
Thus, in general, for smooth and convex unconstrained criteria, Pareto-stationarity is a nec-
essary condition for Pareto-optimality. Inversely, if the smooth criteria Ji(Y ) (1 ≤ i ≤ n) are not
Pareto-stationary at a given design-point Y 0, descent directions common to all criteria exist. We
now examine how such a direction can be identified. We have the following :
Combining Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 with Definition 1 yields the following :
Theorem 1
Let H be a Hilbert space of finite or infinite dimension N . Let Ji(Y ) (1 ≤ i ≤ n) be n smooth and
convex objective-functions of the vector Y ∈ B ⊆ H, and Y 0 a particular admissible design-point,
at which the gradient-vectors are denoted u0i = ∇Ji(Y 0), and
U =
{
w ∈ H / w =
n∑
i=1
αi u
0
i ; αi > 0 (∀i) ;
n∑
i=1
αi = 1
}
(14)
Let ω be the minimal-norm element of the convex hull U , closure of U . Then :
1. either ω = 0, and the criteria Ji(Y ) (1 ≤ i ≤ n) are Pareto-stationary at Y = Y 0;
2. or ω 6= 0 and −ω is a descent direction common to all the criteria; additionally, if ω ∈ U ,
the scalar product (u¯, ω) is equal to ‖ω‖2 for all u¯ ∈ U .
Proof : all the elements of this theorem are reformulations of previous results, except for the
statement concerning the scalar product (u¯, ω) in the second case when additionally ω ∈ U (and
not simply U). To establish this last point, observe that under these assumptions, the element ω
is the solution to the following minimization problem :
ω = u =
n∑
i=1
αiu
0
i , α = Argmin j(u) , j(u) = (u, u) ,
n∑
i=1
αi = 1 (15)
since by hypothesis, none of the inequality constraints, αi > 0, is saturated. Consequently, using
the vector α ∈ Rn as the finite-dimensional variable, the Lagrangian writes :
L(α, λ) = j + λ
(
n∑
i=1
αi − 1
)
(16)
and the optimality conditions satisfied by the vector α are the following :
∂L
∂αi
= 0 (∀i) , ∂L
∂λ
= 0 (17)
These equations imply that for all indices i :
∂j
∂αi
+ λ = 0 (18)
But, j(u) = (u, u) and for u = ω =
∑n
i=1 αiui, one has :
∂j
∂αi
= 2(
∂u
∂αi
, u) = 2(u0i , ω) = −λ =⇒ (u0i , ω) = −λ/2 (19)
independently of i. Now consider an arbitrary element u¯ ∈ U :
u¯ =
n∑
i=1
µi u
0
i (20)
Inria
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where µi ≥ 0 (∀i) and
∑n
i=1 µi = 1. Then :
(u¯, ω) =
n∑
i=1
µi (u
0
i , ω) = −λ/2 (a constant) = ‖ω‖2 (21)
where the constant has been evaluated by letting u¯ = ω.
In summary, one is led to identify the vector
ω =
n∑
i=1
αi u
0
i (22)
by solving the following quadratic-form constrained minimization problem in Rn :
min
α∈Rn
∥∥∥∥∥
n∑
i=1
αi u
0
i
∥∥∥∥∥
2
(23)
subject to :
αi ≥ 0 (∀i) ,
n∑
i=1
αi = 1 (24)
Note that in a finite-dimensional setting, and in a functional-space setting as well, the above
problem can be solved in Rn, so long as the gradients {u0i } (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and their scalar products
{u0ij := (u0i , u0j )} are known. Then, a call to a library procedure should be sufficient.
Let us now examine the instructive particular case of two criteria (n = 2). Let u = u01, v = u02,
α = α1 and α2 = 1− α, to simplify the notation, and consider the following quadratic form :
j(α) = ‖αu+ (1− α)v‖2 =
(
αu+ (1− α)v, αu+ (1− α)v
)
(25)
so that :
j′(α) = 2
(
u− v, α(u− v) + v
)
(26)
Hence, putting aside the trivial case where u = v, the minimum is achieved for
α =
v.(v − u)
‖u− v‖2 =
‖v‖2 − v.u
‖u‖2 + ‖v‖2 − 2u.v (27)
In fact, the orthogonal projection of the null vector 0 onto the the convex hull given by αu+(1−α)v
(without limitation on α), is given by the condition :(
αu+ (1− α)v
)
.(u− v) = 0 (28)
which gives the same expression for α.
This expression shows that if the vectors u and v are first normalized so that ‖u‖ = ‖v‖ = 1,
one gets α = 12 . Inversely, if the vectors u and v are not normalized first, it is not certain that the
above α be in [0,1]; indeed, utilizing here the usual dot-product notation for the scalar product,
one has :
0 < α < 1⇐⇒ 0 < ‖v‖2 − v.u < ‖u‖2 + ‖v‖2 − 2u.v
⇐⇒ u.v < min
(
‖u‖2 , ‖v‖2
)
= min
(
‖u‖ , ‖v‖
)2
⇐⇒ cos (̂u, v) <
min
(
‖u‖ , ‖v‖
)
max
(
‖u‖ , ‖v‖
)
⇐⇒ (̂u, v) > cos−1
min
(
‖u‖ , ‖v‖
)
max
(
‖u‖ , ‖v‖
)
(29)
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Thus the condition is that the angle (̂u, v) between the two gradient-vectors u and v be at
least equal to a certain limit-angle which is a function of their norms whose values are in [0, pi/2].
A sufficient condition is therefore that this angle be obtuse (u.v < 0). Whenever the norms of
the gradient-vectors u and v are very different, the limit-angle is close to pi/2. Inversely, if the
norms are close to one another, the limit-angle is small, and the condition is satisfied except if the
directions of the two gradient-vectors are too close (see Figure 1).
uv ω
u
v
ω
uv = ω
Figure 1: Various possible configurations of the two gradient-vectors u and v and the minimal-
norm element ω depending on whether the angle (̂u, v) is obtuse (left), acute but superior to the
limit-angle (center), or acute and inferior to the limit-angle (right).
Also note that in the first two cases on the left of Figure 1, the vector ω points strictly in
between the vectors representing u and v, and this corresponds to situations in which ω ∈ U , and
not simply U . Then, ω is orthogonal to the dashed line that connects the extremities of these
representatives, and evidently, as a result, the scalar product (u¯, ω) is constant and equal to ‖ω‖2
for all u¯ ∈ U , as stated in the theorem.
Thus, the solution is the following :
α =

v.(v − u)
‖u− v‖2 if u.v < min
(
‖u‖ , ‖v‖
)2
0 or 1 otherwise, depending on whether min
(
‖u‖ , ‖v‖
)
= v or u .
(30)
Lastly, when α ∈ [0, 1], let :
θ = (̂u, v) γ = u.v = ‖u‖ ‖v‖ cos θ (31)
One has :
ω =
‖v‖2 − u.v
‖u‖2 + ‖v‖2 − 2u.v u+
‖u‖2 − u.v
‖u‖2 + ‖v‖2 − 2u.v v (32)
Then :
u.ω =
(
‖v‖2 − γ
)
‖u‖2 +
(
‖u‖2 − γ
)
γ
‖u− v‖2 =
‖u‖2 ‖v‖2 − γ2
‖u− v‖2 =
‖u‖2 ‖v‖2
‖u− v‖2 sin
2 (̂u, v) ≥ 0 (33)
which is symmetric w.r.t. u and v; hence :
u.ω = v.ω (34)
which, in part, constitutes a direct verification of Theorem 1.
3 Numerical strategy for multiobjective optimization
Given an initial admissible design-point Y 0 at which the smooth criteria Ji(Y ) (1 ≤ i ≤ n) are
not Pareto-stationary, we propose to develop the optimization process in several stages described
in the following subsections.
Inria
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3.1 Optional preliminary reformulation of criteria
In numerical experiments, it is preferable that the various criteria all be positive, and scaled in a
somewhat unified way. To achieve this, we propose to modify the definitions of the criteria without
altering the sense of the associated minimization problems.
For this purpose, let :
BR = B
(
Y 0, R
)
(35)
be a working ball in the design space about the initial design-point Y 0.
In a first step, we propose to replace each criterion Ji(Y ) by the following :
J˜i(Y ) = exp
(
αi
∥∥H0i ∥∥
‖∇J0i ‖2
(
Ji(Y )− J0i
))
(36)
where :
– the superscript 0 indicates an evaluation at Y = Y 0;
– ∇J0i and H0i denote the gradient-vector and the Hessian matrix, and
∥∥H0i ∥∥ can be computed
economically as :
√
trace
[
(H0i )
2
]
;
– αi is a dimensionless constant.
In this way, the new criteria are dimensionless, they vary in the same sense as the original
ones, and :
∀i , J˜i(Y 0) = 1 , ∇Ji(Y 0) = γ
R
(37)
provided the constants αi’s are chosen to satisfy :
αi
∥∥H0i ∥∥
‖∇J0i ‖
=
γ
R
∼ 1 (38)
In the above, the dimensionless constant γ is given a value equal or close to the possibly-
dimensional measure of R in the utilized system of units.
For a reason that will appear later, without altering the regularity of the criteria, we would
like them to be infinite when ‖Y ‖ is infinite. For this, define the following function :
φ(x) =

0 if x ≤ 0
x exp
(
− 1
x2
)
if x > 0
(39)
This function is C∞ including at 0, and φ(x) ∼ x as x→ +∞. The new criterion
˜˜Ji(Y ) = J˜i(Y ) + ε0 φ
(∥∥Y − Y 0∥∥2
R2
− 1
)
(40)
in which ε0 is some strictly-positive constant, is identical to the former one, J˜ , inside the working
ball BR, and grows at least like ‖Y ‖2 outside. The match of ˜˜Ji(Y ) with J˜i(Y ) and Ji(Y ) at the
boundary of the working ball is infinitely smooth. Additionally :
lim
‖Y ‖→∞
˜˜Ji(Y ) =∞ (41)
In what follows, it is implicit that the original criteria have been replaced by { ˜˜Ji(Y )} (1 ≤ i ≤
n) and the double superscript ˜˜ is omitted.
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3.2 Cooperative-optimization phase : the Multiple-Gradient Descent
Algorithm (MGDA)
The MGDA relies on the results of Theorem 1. The MGDA consists in iterating the following
sequence :
1. Compute the gradient-vectors u0i = ∇Ji(Y 0), and determine the minimum-norm element ω
in the convex hull U . If ω = 0, stop.
2. Otherwise, determine the step-size h which is, presumably optimally, the largest strictly-
positive real number for which all the functions ji(t) = Ji(Y 0−tω) (1 ≤ i ≤ n) are monotone-
decreasing over the interval [0, h].
3. Reset Y 0 to Y 0 − hω.
In practice, the test ω = 0 will be made with a tolerance (‖ω‖ < tol). In addition, note
that the determination of the step-size h can be realized by the adaptation of nearly all standard
one-dimensional search methods. This algorithm can be repeated a finite number of iterations
if these iterations yield a design-point at which the Pareto-stationarity condition is satisfied, or
indefinitely, if this never occurs.
Since at each iteration of the MGDA, all the criteria diminish, we refer to this process as a
cooperative-optimization phase.
3.3 Convergence of the MGDA
The above MGDA can stop after a finite number of iterations if a Pareto-stationary design-point
is reached. Otherwise, we have the following :
Theorem 2
If the sequence of iterates {Y r} of theMGDA is infinite, it admits a weakly convergent subsequence.
(Here, the working Hilbert space H is assumed to be reflexive.)
Proof : the following elements hold, in part by virtue of the reformulation of the criteria :
• Since the sequence of values of any considered criterion, say {J1(Y r)}, is positive and
monotone-decreasing, it is bounded.
• Since J1(Y ) is infinite whenever ‖Y ‖ is infinite, the sequence of design-vectors {Y r} is
bounded, and this implies the statement.
Let Y ? be the limit. We conjecture that the design-point Y ? is Pareto-stationary. In what
follows, Y 0 is then reset to Y ?.
3.4 Competitive-optimization phase
From a Pareto-stationary design-point Y 0, we propose either to interrupt the whole optimization
process if the performance of the design-point is already satisfactory, or to continue this process
by a competitive optimization phase. The competitive-optimization phase can be accomplished
by a Nash game based on an appropriate split of variables (see next section for the case of two
disciplines).
Inria
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4 Nash game from a Pareto-stationary design-point (n = 2)
In this section, we propose recommendations to construct a Nash game to carry out the competitive-
optimization phase, after completion of the cooperative-optimization phase, in the case of two
disciplines (n = 2).
In the report [4], a split of territory was defined from the knowledge of a stationary point of
one discipline, the preponderant discipline. Since critical points of one discipline are particular
Pareto-stationary points, this subsection is meant to generalize the results of the former report.
For simplicity, we consider the case of two disciplines only (n = 2). An initial Pareto-stationary
design-point Y 0 is known, and should be used to define a split of variables based on local eigen-
systems, and a Nash equilibrium-point determined subsequently.
Here, the two criteria are denoted JA and JB , and at Y = Y 0, the following holds :
αA∇J0A + αB ∇J0B = 0 αA + αB = 1 (42)
for some αA ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, three cases are possible :
1. Pareto-stationarity of type I : ∇J0A = ∇J0B = 0;
2. Pareto-stationarity of type II : ∇J0A = 0 and ∇J0B 6= 0 (or vice versa);
3. Pareto-stationarity of type III : ∇J0A + λ∇J0B = 0 for λ = 1−αAαA > 0 since 0 < αa < 1.
The question is what to do next to reaching a design-point Y 0 of Pareto-stationarity of the
criteria (JA , JB)? To better understand the question, let us examine first the above three cases
assuming both criteria are locally convex.
Convex case :
1. Pareto-stationarity of type I : then, both criteria have simultaneously achieved at Y = Y 0
local minimums of their own. In general the optimization process is terminated.
2. Pareto-stationarity of type II : e.g. ∇J0A = 0 and ∇J0B 6= 0. Then, JA has achieved a local
minimum, whereas JB is still reducible. The decision can be to interrupt the process if the
achieved design is acceptable, or to continue it using the formulation of the former theory
[4] : a Nash equilibrium is sought based on a hierarchical split of variables in the orthogonal
basis made of the eigenvectors of matrix H0A.
3. Pareto-stationarity of type III : ∇J0A + λ∇J0B = 0 (λ > 0). Here, Pareto-optimality has
been achieved and in the absence of an additional criterion, the optimization process is
terminated.
We now turn to the general case in which the criteria are not assumed to be locally convex at
Y = Y 0.
Non convex case : In what follows, we discuss the different cases according to various assump-
tions that can be made on the eigenvalues of the Hessian matrices H0A and H
0
B of the two criteria
at Y = Y 0.
1. Pareto-stationarity of type I :
Since both gradients are equal to zero, the principal term in the expansion of the variations
of the two criteria caused by a perturbation δY of the design vector Y about Y 0 are the
quadratic terms associated with the respective Hessian matrices, one of which, at least, is
not positive-definite by assumption, and perhaps both.
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If H0A is positive-definite and H
0
B alone has some negative eigenvalues, JA has achieved a
minimum whereas JB is still reducible. Then we propose to terminate the optimization
process, or to continue it using the formulation of the former theory [4] : a Nash equilibrium
is sought with a hierarchical split of variables based on the eigensystem of matrix H0A.
If both Hessian matrices H0A and H
0
B have some negative eigenvalues, define the following
families of linearly independent eigenvectors associated with these eigenvalues :
FA = {u1 , u2 , ... , up } FB = { v1 , v2 , ... , vq } (43)
Then :
• If the family FA ∪ FB is linearly dependent, say
p∑
i=1
αi ui −
q∑
j=1
βj vj = 0 (44)
in which {αi}i=1,...,p ∪ {βj}j=1,...,q 6= {0}, the vector
wr =
p∑
i=1
αi ui =
q∑
j=1
βj vj (45)
is not equal to zero (by linear independence of the families FA and FB separately),
and it is a descent direction for both criteria. We then propose to make a step in that
direction.
• Otherwise, SpFA ∩ SpFB = {0}: then we propose to stop, or to determine the Nash
equilibrium point using FA (resp. FB) as the strategy of A (resp. B).
2. Pareto-stationarity of type II : say ∇J0A = 0 and ∇J0B 6= 0.
If the Hessian matrix H0A is positive-definite, the criterion JA has achieved a local minimum
and this setting has been analyzed in [4] : a Nash equilibrium is sought with a hierarchical
split based on the structure of the eigenvectors of H0A.
If instead the matrix H0A has some negative eigenvalues, let
FA = {u1 , u2 , ... , up } (46)
be a family of associated eigenvectors. Then :
• if ∇J0B is not orthogonal to SpFA : a descent direction common to JA and JB exists
in SpFA: use it to reduce both criteria.
• otherwise, ∇J0B ⊥ SpFA : we propose to identify the Nash equilibrium using FA as the
strategy of player A and the remaining eigenvectors of H0A as the strategy of player B.
3. Pareto-stationarity of type III : ∇J0A + λ∇J0B = 0 (λ > 0).
Consider the direction defined by the vector :
uAB =
∇J0A
‖∇J0A‖
= − ∇J
0
B
‖∇J0B‖
(47)
Along this direction, the two criteria vary in opposite ways and no rational decision can be
made in the absence of other criteria. Thus consider instead possible move in the hyperplane
orthogonal to uAB . For this, consider reduced Hessian matrices :
H0A
′
= PAB H
0
A PAB H
0
B
′
= PAB H
0
B PAB (48)
where :
PAB = I − [uAB ] [uAB ]t . (49)
In this hyperplane, by orthogonality to the gradient-vectors, the analysis is that of Pareto-
stationary point of type I in a subspace of dimension N − 1.
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5 Conclusion
In this report, we have considered the problem of simultaneous unconstrained minimization of n
smooth criteria. We have defined the notion of Pareto-stationarity, a weak form of the classical
Pareto optimality. We have shown that when the current design point is not one of Pareto
stationarity, the unique element ω of minimum norm in the convex hull of the gradient-vectors is
nonzero, and −ω is a descent direction for all criteria simultaneously. This has led us to define
the Multiple-Gradient Descent Algorithm (MGDA) which generalizes the classical steepest-descent
algorithm to n disciplines, permitting to carry out a cooperative-optimization phase throughout
which all criteria diminish at each iteration. This phase is possible until a Pareto-stationary design-
point is reached associated with a representation point on the Pareto set. Then a competitive-
optimization phase can be defined if the process of optimization should be continued. This new
phase can be realized by a Nash game based on a split of variables guided by the analysis of the
eigensystems of the Hessian matrices, in a way that generalizes the results of [4].
RR n° 6953
14 Jean-Antoine Désidéri
Acknowledgement
The author wishes to express his appreciation to his colleague Abderrahmane Habbal for
extremely fruitful scientific discussions with him.
Inria
MGDA 15
References
[1] B. Abou El Majd, Algorithmes hiérarchiques et stratégies de jeux pour l’optimisation multi-
disciplinaire – Application à l’optimisation de la voilure d’un avion d’affaires, Ph.D. thesis,
Université de Nice-Sophia Antipolis, 2007.
[2] T. Basar and G. J. Olsder, Dynamic noncooperative game theory, Academic, Bodmin, Cornwall,
Great Britain, 1995.
[3] S. Boyd and L. Vandenberghe, Convex optimization, Cambridge University Press, 2004, ISBN
978-0-521-83378-3. Retrieved October 3.
[4] J.-A. Désidéri, Split of Territories in Concurrent Optimization, Research Report 6108, INRIA,
October 2007, URL: https://hal.inria.fr/inria-00127194 (version 6).
[5] K. M. Miettinen, Nonlinear multiobjective optimization, Kluwer Academic Publishers,
Boston/London/Dordrecht, 1999.
[6] J. F. Nash, Non-Cooperative Games, Annals of Mathematics 54 (1951), no. 2, 286–295.
RR n° 6953
16 Jean-Antoine Désidéri
Contents
1 Introduction, problem setting and notations 3
2 Pareto concepts 4
3 Numerical strategy for multiobjective optimization 8
3.1 Optional preliminary reformulation of criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2 Cooperative-optimization phase : the Multiple-Gradient Descent Algorithm (MGDA) 10
3.3 Convergence of the MGDA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.4 Competitive-optimization phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4 Nash game from a Pareto-stationary design-point (n = 2) 11
5 Conclusion 13
Inria
RESEARCH CENTRE
SOPHIA ANTIPOLIS – MÉDITERRANÉE
2004 route des Lucioles - BP 93
06902 Sophia Antipolis Cedex
Publisher
Inria
Domaine de Voluceau - Rocquencourt
BP 105 - 78153 Le Chesnay Cedex
inria.fr
ISSN 0249-6399
